just one of the institutional practices that eroded quickly during Shen's tenure as senior grand secretary (1583-1591).
Under T'ai-tsu's shadow, the management of state affairs had been balanced uneasily between the throne and the Grand Secretariat, and between the Grand Secretariat and the ministries. The decade 1583-1593 saw this balance undone as Chang Chu-cheng's legacy and T'ai-tsu's institutions bedeviled the relationship between the Wanli emperor, the Grand Secretariat, and the opposition. Tension grew between the emperor and the opposition, each offering conflicting interpretations of T'ai-tsu's rules regarding imperial power and its limitations. Meanwhile, the opposition called for the Grand Secretariat to relinquish control over the six ministries, using T'ai-tsu's intent as their justification. Thus, the emperor bent the Grand Secretariat to its knee and the opposition tried to free the six ministries from the Secretariat's interference. Pressured from both sides, Shen Shih-hsing used their conflicting interests of the emperor and the opposition to further his ends. The entanglement of this triad gradually undermined the government, taking it to uncharted territory, with ominous implications for the future.
Obstreperous Emperor
The Wan-li emperor, after 1582, "rapidly degenerated into a selfindulgent and irresponsible despot."'5 The remaining thirty-eight years of his reign witnessed the full exhibition of his unbridled character: aloofness from government affairs, volatile temper, and extravagance.'6 His isolation deepened his suspicion and distrust of officials, creating a vicious cycle in which he raged against outspoken critics, cut off communications with the government, and unleashed eunuchs as his special agents in the ruthless pursuit of wealth, thereby generating still more criticism. 7 One scholar-official lamented that the emperor's desire ran rampant at the cost of his people's flesh and blood, leaving them impoverished and putting the state in great peril. 18 All of these problems began to surface as early as in 1585. One of the alarming indicators was the emperor's withdrawal from his imperial duties. Study sessions, ceremonies, memorials, and daily audiences with officials bored him. Drink, sex, and extravagance gave him excitement and pleasure. He remained aloof from government affairs, while insisting on his right to ultimate power.
We should not underestimate the importance of imperial study sessions, ceremonies, reviewing of memorials, and daily audiences. Woven together as a web of restraints, they worked to mold an emperor's public persona as a responsible ruler and a man of dignity and compassion. These rituals exalted the emperor, but they also restrained him, trimming his rough edges and taming his tyrannical impulse as far as was possible. Above all, they pressured him to maintain a modicum of civility and self-restraint toward his subjects, especially those around him. The frightening consequences of an emperor's non-compliance were a sufficient impetus for officials to urge him to play his assigned roles. Understandably, then, several heated controversies at the late-Ming court focused on imperial deportment and decorum.
In a small, isolated world where humble eunuchs and submissive grand secretaries kowtowed to him, the Wan-li emperor defied political and ethical constraints. He did not encounter much resistance from his senior grand secretary: Shen Shih-hsing carefully calculated how much risk would be involved if he upset the emperor. The condemnation of Chang Chti-cheng served as a reminder.
The year 1586 saw the emperor's behavior obstruct the operation of the government and his resentment toward criticism harden, when the issue of choosing an heir apparent (the so-called Kuo-pen [ 74S controversy, which I shall discuss later) began to heat up. Since Shen Shih-hsing was reluctant to speak frankly to the emperor and other senior officials followed suit, junior officials took on the task of confronting him. The "avenues of criticism" (yen-lu i ), an institutional mechanism dating from the beginning of the dynasty, permitted them to admonish the emperor and senior officials. 19 Wanli's cancellation of study sessions, official audiences, and ceremonial proceedings late that year prompted Lu Hung-ch'un X 4 , a secretary of Rites, to submit a critical memorial.
In his edict, the Wan-li emperor had adduced health problems to justify the cancellation. Lu's memorial cited information leaked to the public that the emperor had fallen off a horse and bruised his forehead, pointing out the contradictions. Whether it was a horseriding accident or dizziness and fatigue,20 he reminded the emperor of the consequences of his behavior, using a traditional technique to warn the emperor that his misconduct would tarnish his image in history: "Your Majesty is observed by the public today, and will be judged by future generations... Even if all the officials, intimidated by Your Majesty, dared not point out your misbehavior, it would be impossible to prohibit such (unfavorable) information from being recorded in unofficial histories passing on to later generations." He then advised the emperor, "If Your Majesty is really sick, you should restrain yourself from pleasure-seeking for the sake of the state. If you are not sick, you should maintain truthfulness in your imperial edict rather than use an excuse leading to the spread of rumors."'21 Lu's memorial enraged the emperor. He was flogged and then cashiered.22 By contrast, Shen Shih-hsing carefully phrased his words to the emperor at the end of 1587: "Your Majesty only attended a lecture once this year. Please pay attention to the study of classics and history next spring."23 The emperor cordially thanked his senior grand secretary, but the following year he failed to attend a single session. Shen submitted the written lectures out of obligation, quietly accepting the emperor's absence. 24 The emperor figured that he could force the officials to keep quiet about his behavior. In principle, the senior grand secretary should counsel him. But Shen Shih-hsing acted as a yes-man; thus it was junior officials that the emperor had to deal with. Wan-li thought that severe consequences, corporal punishment in particular, would silence them.25 Much to his dismay, intimidation did not work on Lu Hung-ch'un, and there was no shortage of courageous junior 20 Lu Hung-ch'un believed that the emperor's indulgence in sexual pleasure probably caused fatigue and dizziness. 21 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 335-339. 22 Ibid., pp. 339-340. 23 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 74, p. 4569. 24 In the opposition's eyes these actions breached the ground rules of politics. Shen Shih-hsing knew very well the procedure that required memorials, after the emperor's review, to be returned to the Six Offices of Scrutiny. The Six Offices of Scrutiny were to make copies of memorials and imperial edicts and then send them to the appropriate ministries. Also, the memorials should be included in the official gazetteers to document the political life of the emperor and the administration.31 This procedure had at least two functions: to keep the communication between the throne and its officials transparent, and to keep them in check. Sequestering critical memorials, known as "liu-chung" I 4i, aimed to purge objectionable materials from the official record. The emperor henceforth did this repeatedly. He "pigeonholed memorials in the palace and refused to make decisions even on appointments, so that large numbers of offices fell permanently vacant and much governmental business could not be carried out at all. "132 Not surprisingly, the "avenues of criticism" became a battleground. The opposition fought to broaden them, defending its right to scrutinize the emperor and the Grand Secretariat. The other side attempted to constrict them, for which purpose the accusation "insubordination" (ch'u-wvei l) was another handy device. Junior officials who 29 in partisan wrangling and mutual torment.43 Wang Hsi-chiieh commented on court politics in a letter to the effect that "The tendency at court these days is that whatever accusers say must be true and whatever defendants say must be false."44 In another letter, he described the court as crowded with "hungry hawks."45 Wang, in other words, implicitly acknowledged that the opposition had won the popularity contest. Its aggressive presence was a reality he and his allies had to reckon with. The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, discussed later in this essay, controlled the decision-making process. While the active members of the opposition were either forced out of government or blocked from promotion,46 the opposition's strength came from its ability to criticize. Its relentless charges stripped the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance of public faith in its trustworthiness, competence, and fairness, and in the character of its members.
The opposition did not stop at submitting official memorials, however. It also boosted public awareness through devastating pamphlets, satire, and fiction. For example, when the examination scandal of 1588 described below intensified, an anonymous broadside entitled "The exile's appeal for justice" appeared in Nanking, a hotbed of active oppositionists. Rhetorically, it put the powerful suspects on "public trial" in the southern capital. Peking banned circulation of this pamphlet.47 Against this background, it is not hard to understand why the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance felt itself preyed upon by hungry hawks.
Rancor over Examinations
In this charged atmosphere, everything and anything could raise suspicion or evoke a heated dispute, followed by attack and counterattack; character assassination became routine. Wu's decision to pass all the essays led to a third memorial, this time byJao Shen PA fF3 (cs. 1583). Jao charged that chief examiner Huang Hung-hsien had placed Wang Heng first to please Wang's father and had passed Li Hung to please his father-in-law, despite inevitable public outrage. "People were so angry that they wanted to spit in Huang Hung-hsien's face and beat him on the back." As for Wu's evaluation, "I learned that some of the candidates were incapable of composing decent essays. Wu Shih-lai, chief of the Censorate, simply accepted all of the essays as fine. Kao Kui argued with him, but he shamelessly insisted upon his judgement. This scandal began as a poorly conceived theft and ended up as a blatant robbery; it began with one person cheating, and ended up with the whole faction cheating."58Jao's rebuke cost him terribly. On behalf of the emperor, the administration threw him in prison, where he was subjected to interrogation and torture and nearly beaten to death. He was later deprived of his official status.59
Huang Hung-hsien submitted nine memorials to the administration vehemently denying all the charges. To Kao's charge, he responded that past examination scandals were exposed by actual evidence. If evidence was insufficient, there were at least plenty of suspicious traces to substantiate the allegations. Never until now had accusations been based on blind prejudice and a few words picked up from the essays. Huang then insisted, "Since (Kao) Kui alleges bribery, he should present the facts as to who offered the bribes, who received them, who passed the money to whom, and who witnessed when and where the pay-off took place. Confronted with actual evidence, I and other examiners can come forward to testify."
As for the prominent backgrounds of the candidates, Huang argued that all the names were concealed and the examiners read not the original essays, but the ones hand-copied by the official clerks. "Were Kao Kui the chief examiner, could he possibly tell which essays were written by a person of humble origin and who therefore should be passed, and which essays were written by a person of official backhsing did not affiliate himself with either side. As a member of the review panel, his observations shed a critical light on Wu Shih-lai's attempt to pass all the essays in order to please the two grand secretaries. Yii Shen-hsing, ch. ground and who therefore should be excluded? Besides, the officer in charge of keeping the examination essays distributed them to the examiners, and then a group of examiners read and graded all the essays... With such procedures, I dared not and could not engage in any illegal deals."
As far as the essay errors were concerned, Huang said that opinions differed on literary style and taste. "What (Kao) Kui approves does not necessarily deserve approval, and what he disapproves does not necessarily deserve disapproval. It is impossible for me or any other examiners to tailor our opinions to Kui's. Furthermore, it is easy to find flaws, but difficult to compose essays. Kui should have remembered his own experience in the provincial examination. Is it reasonable to demand perfect essays? Is it fair to make a bribery charge based on a few flaws?"
In conclusion, Huang defended his integrity. "I come from a family that has served the government for a few generations with a clean conscience. I am not a beggar. Who in the world would be so insane as to take such a risk in order to ingratiate himself with the grand secretaries, who don't abuse power, and to take a few stinking coppers from fellow provincials?"60
In another memorial Huang responded toJao Shen's charge. "(Jao) Shen laid out three charges against me. First, Wang Heng, son of the Grand Secretary, should not be placed first. Given that the candidates' names are concealed and the essays handed to us are handcopied by the clerks, it is the quality of the essays that counts. Wang Heng's remarkable intelligence has been nationally recognized ever since he was a child. Even Kao Kui acknowledges his talent." It was a unanimous consensus among fourteen examiners as to which were the best essays. "When we opened the seal, we saw the name of Wang Heng. Is it right for me to disregard his essays for the sake of keeping a distance from power? His essays are now widely circulated with high praise. Is Jao) Shen the only man who doesn't know about it? On reexamination, Wang Heng took the brush and finished the essays, thousands of words, right away." As to the second and third charges involving Li Hung and several other implicated candidates, Huang maintained that his colleagues passed their essays; and he respected their decisions.61
The administration's harsh punishment of Kao Kui andJao Shen invited even louder protests from the opposition. The opposition was 60 Huang Hung-hsien, Pi-shan hsiieh-shih chi, ch. 8, 30/248-250. 61 Ibid., ch. 8, 30/252 convinced that Huang Hung-hsien had abused his power as the chief examiner to make a big profit. One memorial claimed that the 1588 metropolitan chui-jen examination had been turned into a market where the price tag for the chui-jen degree was 5,000 taels of silver.62 Another suggested that Huang's decision to place Wang Heng first was calculated to seek Wang Hsi-chtieh's support for Huang The controversy could have been avoided if the Wan-li emperor had followed T'ai-tsu's rules. According to the rules, as the opposition pointed out, naming an heir apparent in a judicious and decisive manner assured a smooth succession. If the empress failed to produce a male child, the vacancy should be filled on the basis of seniority.72 The emperor was expected to make his decision at the earliest possible time. In most previous cases the heir apparent had been chosen at age five or six and had immediately begun his formal education under Han-lin academicians.73
The Wan-li emperor insisted that the precepts preferred the empress's son as heir apparent. Therefore, he wished to wait a few years to see whether his youthful empress would produce a boy. The year 1593 saw Wang Hsi-chtieh, the emperor's choice as senior grand secretary, take charge of the administration.83 He assumed the office during a nervous waiting period for the emperor's delivery on his promise. The Ministry of Rites asked the emperor for instructions concerning the ceremonies for the announcement of the heir apparent, but received none.84
The positions of the emperor and of the opposition were irreconcilable. Wang Hsi-chueh could not resolve the deadlock. To support the opposition, even though it was institutionally the right thing, was a recipe for losing imperial patronage and putting his career on the line. Besides, it was the emperor who had made him the top man, whereas the political wounds inflicted on him by the opposition were still smarting. At any rate, his first priority was to look after his own interests. Anticipating a bumpy road ahead, he carefully crafted his advice to the emperor so that the latter understood his meaning, while its ambiguity and evasiveness left no clear evidence for his opponents to use against him.
Wang Hsi-chueh and the emperor exchanged confidential memorandums that set the stage for an imperial announcement. Wang's memorandum stressed that the choice of heir apparent rested with no one but His Majesty; a slip of paper from His Majesty would settle 81 It was customary in the Grand Secretariat that the grand secretaries bowed to the authority of the senior grand secretary. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/243. Chao I, Er-shih-er shih cha-chi, ch. 33, p. 483. There were few occasions when grand secretaries found some channels to vent their views, as is seen in the memorial submitted by Hsu Kuo and Wang Chia-p'ing in the absence of Shen Shih-hsing. The Wan-li emperor usually kept the secret memorandums in the palace, but he deliberately returned Shen's to the Grand Secretariat to humiliate Hsu and Wang. The memorandum was a slap in their faces. The two grand secretaries, instead of keeping the memorandum in their office, sent it to Lo Ta-hung, the supervising secretary of the Ministry of Rites, who was bound to release it to the public, thereby putting Shen Shih-hsing on the spot. In an attempt to minimize the damage, Shen sent a clerk to Lo's office to "borrow" the memorandum, but he refused to return it when Lo came to pick it up the next day. Even though the emperor emphasized that his decision was consistent with T'ai-tsu's precepts, his critics found serious flaws in his interpretation. Guessing that what was really on his mind was the installation of the son of Consort Cheng, they argued that only when an emperor had no male children and the heir apparent was selected from a cadet family, was there a strict provision that the candidate's mother must be the prince's principal wife. Otherwise, the precepts dictated that if the empress did not have a son, the heir apparent must be decided on the basis of seniority.86 The Wan-li emperor had taken this provision out of context and twisted it to his needs.
Anticipating strong objections from his officials, the Wan-li emperor skipped any court discussion and proceeded to announce his decision. It was even more troubling to many officials that Wang Hsi-chuieh, the only person consulted by the emperor, assisted him in sidestepping the succession rules.87 The opposition demanded a reversal. Some kept vivid accounts of their intensive lobbying, their protest via memorials, and their confrontation with Wang Hsi-chueh in his office: these accounts offer an extraordinary glimpse of the strained relationship between the emperor and his officials. office,88 Yueh Yuian-sheng -2-E E recalled that Wang was angry and raised his voice several times over the course of their conversation. Yueh raised his voice as well and said to Wang: "There is no alternative but that we officials pressure you, Sir, to tell the emperor to retract his decision." Wang responded: "Then I must report your names," to which Yueh answered: "Put my name first. The interest of the state is at stake. It is worth flogging, exile, demotion or dismissal, so long as the decision is overturned."89
In the end Wang Hsi-chiieh yielded to the pressure and submitted a memorial apologizing for his misunderstanding of the succession rules, and asking the emperor to retract his decision.90 The emperor replied to his senior grand secretary, "You have admitted the mistakes, leaving me nowhere to turn to. I will cancel the decision. However, I shall not name an heir apparent for two or three years, during which time the empress may bear me a son. If she doesn't, only then will I appoint an heir apparent."9' The immediate crisis was resolved, but it took yet another eight years before the emperor finally named the eldest imperial son his successor. =-"t t (1582-1664) was to say, ''OfElcials working for Chiang-ling aI 0 (i.e., Chang Chu-cheng) were competent horses, whereas officials affiliated with the grand secretaries after Chang were shrewd foxes and cunning rats.''12l This late Ming observation depicts "foxes" and "rats" destroying the institutional and ethical foundation of the state. When a modern scholar contrasts Shen Shih-hsing's sincerity and humility with Chang Chu-cheng's arrogance, asserting that Chang "tended to overlook the larger issues and in the end evolved into the kind of man Mencius had described as capable of seeing the barbs of a feather but unable to visualize a cartload of faggots,''122 we can only disagree. It is important, in this regard, to be reminded of Hai Jui's assessment at the time: Chang Chu-cheng had a great talent for managing state afEairs, but was not good at protecting his own interests ()! E I 5 =n= g , tS 9 = X). 123 The reverse could actually be said of Shen Shih-hsing.
Institutional Erosion
Shen Shih-hsing inherited from Chang Chu-cheng efficient management of state afEairs, well-guarded frontiers, sound fiscal policies, and overflowing treasuries. 124 By 1591, after nine years as Senior C;rand Secretary, he left behind a government crippled by partisan politics, maladministration, corruption, deficits, frontier defense failures, and, more dreadfully, by the breakdown of the procedural checks on imperial irresponsibility and arbitrariness.125
In a letter to Left Censor-in-chiefLi Shih-ta t2(1531-1599), Chao Yung-hsien blamed Shen's administration for this appalling disintegration and called Li's attention to the problems that afilicted the Censorate. That institution, in Chao's opinion, had over the recent decade been reduced to the Grand Secretariat's partisan tool, blocking the opposition from reprimanding the administration for its misconduct. "The Censorate is obliged to investigate and impeach wrongdoing so as to keep officials under discipline," he recalled; but, contrary to their duty, the censors only went after outspoken officials. The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, as Chao saw it, provided a sanctuary for corruption, a disease that weakened institutional practices and political ethics more rapidly than ever before. Corruption in the Censorate was not just the failure of one office or an isolated case, such as a failure of the Grand Secretariat. Charged as it was with the enormous responsibility of searching out illegal activities in officialdom, the Censorate itself committed corruption and bribery. These were offices that used their power to engage in all sorts of unethical transactions, with the connivance of powerful patrons.
Taking censorial inspection as example, Chao said the following:
There is a strict and orderly procedure for scheduling provincial inspection assignments. When Chiang-ling (i.e. Chang Chu-cheng) was in power, the procedure was observed. But lobbying for assignment is common nowadays. 132 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/31. As a crucial part of the appointment and evaluation system of the Ming, all the officials outside the capital were subject to evaluation every three years, known as the triennial "great reckoning," or ta-chi 7k =t. All the officials in the capital below fourth rank were subjected to a similar evaluation every six years, known as the sexennial capital evaluation, or ching-ch'a f W. -1628) , the director of the Bureau of Appointments. The stakes on both sides were very high, since the capital evaluations "could result in drastic changes of personnel at the higher echelons and mark the onset of new policies." '135 The 1593 capital evaluations proceeded strictly under the direction of the Minister of Personnel, independent of the Grand Secretariat's influence. To ensure the integrity of the evaluations, Sun Lung and Chao Nan-hsing applied the strict rules to themselves first, by demoting their own relatives. After this, no one dared to tamper with the process. 136 Their report went directly to the emperor, without any consultation of the Grand Secretariat; and it came as no surprise that among the dismissed and demoted were favorites of the grand secretaries. 137 The 1593 capital evaluation challenged the decades-old practice following which the Grand Secretariat, not the Ministry of Personnel, always called the shots on important personnel decisions. 138 Wang Hsi-chuieh, who was now Senior Grand Secretary, felt threatened as Sun Lung and Chao Nan-hsing could now rally the six ministries to free themselves from the Grand Secretariat's influence, a cause which the opposition had long advocated. To eliminate this threat, he turned to the emperor for support. An imperial edict was issued, reproaching Sun Lung for arbitrary use of authority and dismissing Chao Nanhsing. The edict prompted Sun Lung to submit his resignation.'39 Unlike Shen Shih-hsing, Wang Hsi-chuieh did not care much for the niceties of politics; he pulled up his sleeves and went after his opponents. Chao Yung-hsien, before being forced out of government, had predicted that vicious attacks upon upright officials would not stop until they were all driven out of government.'40 Playing rough, however, only increased the tension between the Grand Secretariat, the Ministry of Personnel, and the opposition. associates provided the opposition with ample ammunition to discredit them on institutional and ethical grounds. The agitated administration in turn punished its critics by means of demotion, dismissal or transfer. As a result, the emperor's caprices and the partisan struggles between the Grand Secretariat and the opposition together destroyed the balance crucial for a reasonable management of state affairs. Upon reflecting on the fall of the Ming, Huang Tsung-hsi X (1610-1695) stated that the origin of misrule under the Ming lay in the abolition of the prime ministership: "After the prime ministership was abolished, the moment an emperor was succeeded by an unworthy son there was no worthy person at all to whom one could turn for help. Then how could even the idea of dynastic succession be maintained?" 144 The compilers of Ming shih, for their part, held the senior grand secretaries accountable for the disintegration. Yet for all their culpability, we must recognize the potential perils of their situation. The senior grand secretaries were held hostage by T'ai-tsu's institutions, which assured the ultimate power of the throne. Operating in a system that did not allow for prime ministership, they were vulnerable both to imperial rage and to the opposition's criticisms. Motivated by the survival instinct, the senior grand secretaries served the emperor humbly, with "the mind of a eunuch or palace maid."'145
The opposition, using T'ai-tsu's abolition of the prime ministership to justify its cause, wished to devolve the managerial power of the Grand Secretariat to the six ministries. In a situation where the emperor was aloof from state affairs and abused his power arbitrarily, the devolution of the Grand Secretariat's managerial power was a recipe for destroying the already very fragile unity of the government. Given the fact that none of the six ministries was able to replace the Grand Secretariat by taking over its policy-making and managerial responsibilities, to nullify the Grand Secretariat was bound to lead to chaos.
With this in mind, and as the disintegration accelerated after 1593, it was not difficult to anticipate the end result. The power struggle between the Grand Secretariat and the Ministry of Personnel paved the way for a savage war of factionalism. When the Wan-li reign approached its end the Grand Secretariat had become utterly dysfunctional. Yeh Hsiang-kao , [pJ E` (1559-1627), the senior grand secretary at the time, could only lament that "the senior grand secretary today is very much like the head of beggars, using up all 144 Huang Tsung-hsi, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, transl. deBary, pp. 101-102. 145 Ibid., p. 95.
